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Abstract
The paper examines three extensively used propositions regarding changes in utility and
social welfare attributable to small changes in consumption bundles. It is shown that, though
these propositions are valid when the changes in consumption bundles are ``infinitesimally
small,'' none of the propositions can be sustained when we have finite changes in
consumption bundles, even when such finite changes are arbitrarily small. This drastically
reduces the usefulness of the propositions for any practical purpose. The paper discusses the
underlying formal structure of the problem and identifies the reason why the propositions run
into difficulties in the case of finite changes.
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The purpose of this note is to reconsider some widely applied propositions about changes
in utility and social welfare resulting from \small" changes in consumption bundles. Speci¯-
cally, we investigate the \national income test" (see Varian, 1992, pp. 407-409) which, given
an increase in real national income at the initial prices, is often used to infer an increase in
potential welfare when the changes in consumption bundles are ¯nite but \small." Starting
with a discussion of the national income test for a one-consumer economy, we then proceed
to examine, for the general case of many consumers, two di®erent versions of the test|one
that assumes the initial distribution of goods to be socially optimal and another that does
not make this assumption. We seek to demonstrate that none of several propositions involv-
ing the national income test is tenable for ¯nite changes in consumption bundles, no matter
how small these changes may be, and that the propositions are, therefore, of doubtful value
for any practical purpose. We also discuss the underlying formal structure of the problem
and identify the °aw in the reasoning that is sometimes advanced in support of these results
in the context of ¯nite changes.
The ¯rst proposition that we examine in this paper relates to the change in a compet-
itive consumer's utility when there is a small change in his/her consumption bundle. As
Varian (1992, p.409) puts it, the claim is that \small changes in [a consumer's consumption
bundle] are preferred or not preferred [by the consumer] as the change in the value of the
bundle is positive or negative."1 The following is a somewhat more explicit statement of the
proposition.
Proposition A: Let xi be the optimal consumption bundle of a competitive con-
sumer, i, in an initial situation where the price vector is p. Let x0
i be another
consumption bundle such that p ¢ x0
i >p¢ xi. Then, if x0
i is \su±ciently close" to
xi, the consumer strictly prefers x0
i to xi.
If valid, in certain situations Proposition A would allow one to infer, on the basis of a
very limited amount of information, an increase in the welfare of a competitive consumer.
Given only that, at the initial prices, the value of the new commodity bundle consumed
by the competitive consumer is higher than the value of the initial consumption bundle,
Proposition A would let us conclude that there is an increase in the consumers welfare,
provided the change in the consumers consumption bundle is \small." However, as we will
show later, this conclusion cannot be sustained for ¯nite changes in the consumption bundle,
however small.
Proposition A, in its turn, constitutes the basis of another proposition which provides a
su±cient condition for \potentially Pareto preferred"2 social changes and is widely used to
assess the e®ect of \small changes" in policy. In Varian's (1992, p. 408) words, Proposition B
tells us that, \if ... national income at the original prices increases ...then it must be possible
1 In what follows, we often refer to the discussion of these claims in Varian (1992). This is partly for the
sake of convenience, Varian (1992) being one of the most authoritative graduate textbooks on microeconomic
theory, and partly because Varian (1992) gives one of the clearest statements of these propositions.
2 Cf. Varian (1992, p. 408).
1to increase every agent's utility," given that the change under consideration is su±ciently
small. A somewhat more explicit statement of this proposition may be given as follows.
Proposition B: Suppose, we have n competitive consumers who, given the price
vector p, are initially optimising subject to their relevant budget constraints. Now
consider a new situation such that the value, at p, of the new aggregate consump-
tion bundle is higher than the value of the initial aggregate consumption bundle.
If the new consumption bundle of every consumer is \su±ciently close" to his/her
initial consumption bundle, then it is possible to redistribute the new aggregate
consumption bundle so as to make every consumer better o® as compared to the
initial situation.
The next proposition involves the assumption of a socially optimal distribution of income
in the initial situation and provides a su±cient condition for an actual increase in social
welfare. It may be stated as follows.
Proposition C: Assume that the initial situation is a competitive equilibrium where
the income distribution is socially optimal. Starting from this initial situation, if
there is an increase in national income at the initial prices, then, provided the new
consumption bundle of every consumer is \su±ciently close" to his/her original
consumption bundle, social welfare in the new situation must be higher than social
welfare in the initial situation.
Note that each of the three propositions involves the stipulation that the new consump-
tion bundle(s) must be su±ciently close to the original consumption bundle(s). How do we
interpret the term \su±ciently close"? One possible interpretation is that the change from
the initial consumption bundle to the new consumption bundle is in¯nitesimally small, so
that the propositions are really about the signs of the relevant derivatives/di®erentials at
the initial situation rather than about the e®ects of ¯nite changes. Under this interpreta-
tion, all three propositions are valid (we comment further on this in Section 5). However,
any practical application of these propositions has to be necessarily in a context where the
changes in consumption bundles are ¯nite. It would, therefore, be tempting to assume that
the propositions are also valid when the term \su±ciently close" is interpreted as referring
to arbitrarily small ¯nite changes. Unfortunately, as we show, none of the propositions re-
mains valid for ¯nite changes in consumption bundles, no matter how small these changes
are assumed to be.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we lay down the few notations that
we need. In Section 3, we give counterexamples to show that none of the three propositions
is valid for ¯nite changes in consumption bundles, even when these changes are stipulated
to be arbitrarily small. In Section 4, we analyse the general structure of the problem and
identify the lacuna in the reasoning that is sometimes given for these claims in the context
of ¯nite changes. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Notation.
Let R be the set of real numbers and R+ be the set of non-negative real numbers. Let n
be the number of consumers in the economy and m be the number of commodities (m>1).
2For every consumer i, the consumption set is assumed to be Rm
+. For all z;z0 2 Rm
+;h (z;z0)
denotes the (Euclidean) distance between z and z0. The consumption bundles of consumer
i are denoted by xi;x 0
i;z i;z 0
i, etc. The prices are all assumed to be positive. The price
vectors are denoted by p; p0, etc. Every consumer i is assumed to have a direct utility function
ui(xi) satisfying the properties of continuity, strict quasi-concavity and strict monotonicity.
Consumer i's wealth is denoted by the non-negative real numbers, wi;w 0
i, etc.
3. Some counterexamples.
We ¯rst construct counterexamples to show that none of the three propositions men-
tioned in Section 1 is valid for ¯nite, though arbitrarily small, changes in consumption
bundles. The following proposition will be useful in this context.
Proposition 1: Let p be the price vector prevailing in the initial situation, where xi (xi 6=0 )
is an optimal consumption bundle of a competitive consumer, i. Then, for every positive
real number g, there exists ¤ xi 2 Rm
+ such that
[h(xi; ¤ xi) <g ; p ¢ ¤ xi >p¢ xi; and ui(¤ xi) <u i(xi)]: (1)
Proof: Let g be any given positive number. Let
H(p;xi): =fzi 2 Rm
+ j p ¢ zi = p ¢ xig;
and let
B(xi): =fzi 2 Rm
+ j ui(zi) ¸ ui(xi)g:
Given strict quasi-concavity of the utility function, there cannot be more than one
optimal consumption bundle for the consumer. Therefore, xi must be the unique optimal
consumption bundle in the initial situation, and we must have H(p;xi)\B(xi)=fxig: This
implies that
8 zi 2 H(p;xi);z i 6= xi =) ui(zi) <u i(xi): (2)
Note that, since xi 6= 0, there exists x0
i 2 H(p;xi) such that xi 6= x0
i. Consider such x0
i.
Since [xi 2 H(p;xi);x 0
i 2 H(p;xi); and xi 6= x0
i], the open interval, ]xi;x 0
i[, is non-empty,
and, for all x00
i 2]xi;x 0
i[;x 00
i 2 H(p;xi). Hence, there must exist ¤ zi 2 H(p;xi) such that
[0 <h (xi; ¤ zi) <g = 2]
Consider such ¤ zi 2 H(p;x0
i). Since ¤ zi 2 H(p;xi);p ¢¤ zi = p¢xi. Also, since xi 6= ¤ zi 2 H(p;xi),
by (2), we have ui(¤ zi) <u i(xi).
Now consider z0
i 2 Rm
+, such that p ¢ z0
i >p¢ xi. Since the prices are positive, such z0
i
exists. Since p ¢ z0
i >p¢ xi and p ¢ ¤ zi = p ¢ xi,
z00
i 2 ]z0
i; ¤ zi[= ) p ¢ z00
i >p¢ xi: (3)
Since ui(¤ zi) <u i(x), by the continuity of the utility function, there exists ¤ xi 2 ]z0
i; ¤ zi[,
such that h(¤ zi; ¤ xi) <g = 2 and ui(¤ xi) <u i(xi). Since h(xi; ¤ zi) <g = 2 and h(¤ zi; ¤ xi) <
3g=2;h (xi; ¤ xi) <g . Also, given ¤ xi 2 ]z0
i ; ¤ zi[, by (3), p ¢ ¤ xi >p¢ xi. Thus, (1) holds for
¤ xi. This completes the proof.
The basic point of Proposition 1 can be illustrated in a simple diagram for the case
of two commodities. In the Figure (located at the end of the paper), the initial optimum
consumption bundle of consumer i is given by xi, where the initial budget frontier, AB,i s
tangent to an indi®erence curve. Now consider the circle, with xi for its centre, which is
shown in the ¯gure. It is clear that there are points in the interior of the circle that are above
the budget frontier and, hence, cost more than xi at the initial prices, and are below the
indi®erence curve, IC, passing through xi. These are the points in the shaded area of the
circle. What happens if we make the circle arbitrarily small? Since the indi®erence curve IC
is strictly convex to the origin and since xi is the point of tangency between AB and IC,i t
is clear that, irrespective of how small the circle is, we can always ¯nd points in the interior
of the circle, which are above AB and below IC. Proposition 1 tells us that, essentially, the
same result holds in the general case.
In view of Proposition 1, Proposition A is clearly non-tenable for ¯nite changes in
the consumer's consumption bundle, even when we assume that these ¯nite changes are
arbitrarily small.3
Usually, Proposition A constitutes the basis of Proposition B (see, for example, Varian
(1992, p.409)), and it is easy to show that Proposition B runs into the same problem as
Proposition A. To see this, consider ¯rst the (trivial) case of a one-consumer economy. Let
p be the initial price vector and let x1 be the initial optimal consumption bundle of the
single consumer in the economy. Then, by Proposition 1, for every positive number g,
we can ¯nd ¤ x1 such that (1) holds. Obviously, in this one-consumer economy, there is no
redistribution of the aggregate consumption bundle ¤ x1 that will make the single consumer
better o® as compared to x1. While, formally, this is a valid counterexample for Proposition
B, it involves the restrictive feature that there is only one consumer in the economy. To
construct a counterexample with n consumers (n>1), consider a competitive, pure exchange





i2 + ¢¢¢+ z
1=2
im . Suppose the initial endowment bundle of each consumer
is given by w, where w contains one unit of each commodity. Then, it is easy to see that
¡
p;(
n times z }| {
w;:::;w)
¢
, where pj = 1 for every commodity j , is a competitive equilibrium for
this economy. The aggregate consumption bundle in this equilibrium is, of course, nw.
Let g be any positive number. Then, noting that all consumers have identical preferences
and identical consumption bundles, w, in the initial situation, by Proposition 1, we can
¯nd a commodity bundle w0 such that w0 contains a positive amount of each commodity;
h(w;w0) <g ; p ¢ w0 >p¢ w; and for every consumer i, ui(w0) <u i(w). Now, consider a
new situation where every consumer consumes w0, so that the new aggregate consumption
3 Of course, given strong monotonicity, the following is true: Let p be the price vector prevailing in the
initial situation where the optimum consumption bundle of competitive consumer i is given by xi (xi 6= 0).
Then, for every positive real number g, there exists ¤ xi 2 Rm
+ such that [h(xi; ¤ xi) <g ; p ¢ ¤ xi >p¢ xi; and
ui(¤ xi) >u i(xi)]. However, this is clearly very di®erent from Proposition A.
4bundle is nw0. By construction, p¢(nw0) >p ¢(nw). However, the new aggregate consumption
bundle, nw0, cannot be redistributed among the consumers to make everybody better o® as
compared to the initial situation. This can be shown as follows. When every consumer
consumes w0, the marginal rate of substitution between every pair of commodities is the
same for all consumers (recall that all consumers have identical preferences). Hence, the
allocation where everybody gets w0 is a Pareto optimal distribution of the aggregate bundle
nw0, and no redistribution of nw0 can make everyone better o® as compared to (
n times z }| {
w0;:::;w0).
Since it is impossible to redistribute nw0 to make every consumer better o® as compared
to (
n times z }| {
w0;:::;w0), it must be impossible to distribute nw0 to make everybody better o® as
compared to the allocation (
n times z }| {
w;:::;w), which is Pareto superior to (
n times z }| {
w0;:::;w0).
To see the di±culty with Proposition C in the case of ¯nite changes, consider a com-
petitive equilibrium where the price vector is p, the consumption bundles are x1;:::;x n, and
the distribution of income is socially optimal. Let g be any given positive number. Then, by
Proposition 1, one can ¯nd consumption bundles ¤ x1;:::;¤ xn such that, for every consumer i,
(1) holds. Clearly, the situation with consumption bundles ¤ x1;:::;¤ xn is socially inferior to
the initial situation under every Paretian social welfare function.
4. The general structure of the problem.
It should not come as a surprise that, when the changes in consumption bundles are
¯nite, one can construct counterexamples for Proposition A, and hence for the other two
propositions based on Proposition A. To see this, it may be helpful to consider the general,
formal structure of our problem. Given that xi is consumer i's optimal consumption bundle
in the initial situation where the price vector is p, ®i p ¢ (x0
i ¡ xi)=rui(xi) ¢ (x0
i ¡ xi),
where ®i is i's marginal utility of wealth. Since ®i is positive (by the assumption of strict
monotonicity of ui), p¢(x0
i ¡xi) and rui(xi)¢(x0
i ¡xi) have the same sign, and the problem
of inferring the sign of [ui(x0
i) ¡ ui(xi)] from the sign of [p ¢ (x0
i ¡ xi)] is, therefore, the
same as the problem of inferring the sign of [ui(x0
i) ¡ ui(xi)] from the sign of the linear
approximation, [rui(xi)¢(x0
i¡xi)], of [ui(x0
i)¡ui(xi)]. The question, therefore, is whether one
can infer anything about the sign of [ui(x0
i)¡ui(xi)] given the sign of its linear approximation
[rui(xi) ¢ (x0
i ¡ xi)].
In general, given an arbitrarily speci¯ed di®erentiable function F : Rm
+ ! R, the sign of
[rF(y)¢(y0¡y)], the linear approximation of [F(y0)¡F(y)], does not tell us anything about
the sign of [F(y0)¡F(y)], no matter how close y0 is to y. However, curvature assumptions on
F can yield de¯nite implications. The following result follows in a straightforward fashion
from the well-known di®erential characterizations of curvature of level sets of F.
Proposition 2:I fF is strictly quasi-concave, rF(y) 6= 0, and y 6= y0, then
[rF(y) ¢ (y0 ¡ y) · 0] =) [F(y0) <F(y)] (4)
5and, hence,
[F(y0) ¸ F(y)] =) [rF(y) ¢ (y0 ¡ y) > 0]: (5)
Weakening the curvature condition from strict quasi-concavity to quasi-concavity in
Proposition 2 converts the strict inequality in (4) to a weak inequality ((5), which is the
contrapositive of (4), then changes appropriately). However, it is not possible to strengthen
either (4) or (5) by strengthening strict quasi-concavity to strict concavity in Proposition 2.
It is also impossible to establish the reverse of the implication, (4) and (5) in Proposition
2. However, the reasoning advanced in the literature in support of Proposition A in the
context of ¯nite changes in consumption bundles essentially amounts to a claim that, when
a function F on Rm
+ is strictly quasi-concave and y 6= y0, we can have the reverse of the
implication in (5), provided y and y0 are su±ciently close. For example, Varian's (1992,
p. 408-409)) justi¯cation for Proposition A in the context of ¯nite changes in consumption
bundles runs as follows. Given the strictly quasi-concave utility function ui, Varian points
out that, when the switch from the initial consumption bundle xi to x0
i is small, using a
¯rst-order Taylor series approximation, we have
ui(x0
i) ¡ ui(xi) ¼r ui(xi) ¢ (x0
i ¡ xi)=®i p ¢ (x0
i ¡ xi) (6)
(recall that ®i is i's (positive) marginal utility of wealth in the initial situation). Given (6),
it is asserted that, if p¢(x0
i¡xi) and, hence, the linear approximation, [rui(xi):(x0
i ¡xi)], of
[ui(x0
i) ¡ ui(xi)], is positive, then so is [ui(x0
i) ¡ ui(xi)]. The problem with this reasoning is
that, while, by taking x0







arbitrarily small, it is still possible to have [ui(x0
i) ¡ ui(xi)] negative
even though [rui(xi) ¢ (x0
i ¡ xi)] happens to be positive. In fact, as Proposition 1 tells
us, in every neighbourhood, however small, of xi, we can ¯nd x0
i such that this \perverse"
possibility holds. This is just an example of our earlier general observation, namely, that it
is not possible to reverse implication (5) in Proposition 2, no matter how close y0 m a yb et o
y. Is it possible to formulate a linear approximation condition which will be su±cient for an
increase in the utility of a consumer? Proposition 2 tells us that, for a strictly quasi-concave
function, a linear approximation condition is su±cient for a decrease in the value of the
function and necessary for an increase in its value, while, for strictly quasi-convex functions,
a linear approximation condition is su±cient for an increase in the value of the function and
necessary for a decrease.
5. Derivatives and ¯nite changes.
We noted earlier that di®erential variants of Propositions A, B, and C are valid. Indeed,
it seems to us that it is these valid results about the signs of relevant derivatives and di®er-
entials, which have given rise to invalid beliefs about the e®ects of ¯nite changes with which
economists are inevitably confronted in applied areas such as cost-bene¯t analysis. In the
context of cost-bene¯t analysis, let b denote the size of a project, and, for every consumer
6i and every commodity k, let xi be a function, xi(b), of b, where, given the size b, xi(b)i s












where, as before, ®i is i's marginal utility of wealth. Thus, dui=db > 0 if and only if P
k pk[dxik=db] > 0. While this is certainly true, it does not justify the claim that, starting
from an initial size
¤
b, if we increase the project size by a ¯nite amount, and if, at the
initial prices, the value of the new consumption bundle of consumer i is higher than the
value of xi(
¤
b) bundle, then i must be better o® after the change, provided the (¯nite)
change in the consumption bundle is su±ciently small: our Proposition 1 shows that this is
not necessarily true, no matter how small the change in the consumption bundle may be.
Similarly, letting dx(b) denote
P
k dxik(b), it can be shown that, if p ¢ dx(b) > 0, then dx(b)
can be distributed to make every consumer better o® than in the initial situation.4 But this
is of little help in practical cost-bene¯t analysis, where, inevitably, we have to consider ¯nite
changes in consumption bundles: however small these ¯nite changes may be, there is always
the possibility that the value, at initial prices, of the incremental aggregate consumption
bundle is positive and, yet, the change is not potentially Pareto superior to the original
situation.
The basic point here is quite general,5 though it is sometimes overlooked when intuitive
interpretations are given for comparative static results derived in terms of derivatives or
di®erentials. Consider a function f(x) where x and f(x) take real (scalar) values. Suppose
it is known that f0(¤ x) is positive, and this is all that is known about the function. While the
information that f0(¤ x) is positive may be interesting, by itself it does not tell us anything
about what happens to f(x) when, starting from ¤ x, there is a \very small" ¯nite increase
in the value of x. This is because it is possible that, for every positive number t, however
small, one can ¯nd a real (scalar) valued function of x such that the function has a positive
¯rst derivative at ¤ x but has a lower value at some point in the interval [¤ x; ¤ x + t] than at ¤ x.
Of course, if f0(x) is positive everywhere (as in the standard comparative-static results in
consumer and producer theory), then we can be sure that an increase in the value of x will
lead to an increase in the value of f(x).
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